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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel intrusion detection
system (IDS) that combines different classifier approaches which
are based on decision tree and rules-based concepts, namely,
REP Tree, JRip algorithm and Forest PA. Specifically, the first
and second method take as inputs features of the data set, and
classify the network traffic as Attack/Benign. The third classifier
uses features of the initial data set in addition to the outputs of the
first and the second classifier as inputs. The experimental results
obtained by analyzing the proposed IDS using the CICIDS2017
dataset, attest their superiority in terms of accuracy, detection
rate, false alarm rate and time overhead as compared to state of
the art existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years cyber attacks, especially those targeting
systems that keep or process sensitive information are be-
coming more sophisticated. Critical National Infrastructures
are main targets of cyber attacks, since essential information
or services depend on their systems and their protection
becomes a signicant issue that is concerning both organizations
and nations [1]. Attacks to such critical systems include
penetrations to their network and installation of malicious
tools or programs that can reveal sensitive data or alter the
behavior of specific physical equipment. In order to tackle
this growing trend academics and industry professionals are
joining forces in an attempt to develop novel systems and
mechanisms that can defend their systems. Along with other
preventive security mechanisms, such as access control and
authentication, intrusion detection systems (IDS) are deployed
as a second line of defense. IDS based on some specific rules
or patterns of normal behavior of the system can distinguish
between normal and malicious actions [2].
Many different taxonomies for IDSs have been proposed
until now. Based on the classification model they use, IDSs
can be classified as rule based, misuse detection and mixed
systems. IDSs can also be classified as or real time if they
use contiguous monitoring of the system or periodic or off
line if the detection happens in specific time instances or
even off line using data that are collected and stored during a
certain period of time. Moreover, when talking about Industrial
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Control Systems (ICS) that have specific requirements and
characteristics novel taxonomies were recently proposed. Au-
thors in [3] proposed a classification of IDSs ICS that divides
them in three new categories: protocol analysis-based, traffic
mining-based, and control process analysis-based.
Countermeasures are taken accordingly to the information
obtained regarding the detected attacks from the detection
systems. The better classification of the type of the attack is
provided, the more efficient countermeasures will be chosen
and the less those will affect the proper operation of the
system or network. Moreover, if we do not detect the exact
type of attack the countermeasures can have more serious
consequences than the attack itself in some cases. For this
reason, our goal is to create an intrusion detection model that
correctly classifies each type of attack. In addition, our model
must provide a low false alarm rate and a high detection rate
both for frequent and infrequent attacks while on the same
require low computing in order to perform classication. The
latter characteristic is very important when IDSs are deployed
in industrial control systems that operate critical infrastructures
where correct and fast notification about cyber attacks is
crucial [4]
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses related work and places the research within that of
the wider community. Section III introduces the key concepts
and the overall architecture of the proposed system. Section
IV presents the experimentation setup, gives the simulation
parameters and describes the evaluation of the method. Section
V concludes the paper.
II. RELEVANT WORK
Table I lists the representative related works on hybrid
intrusion detection systems, including, machine learning and
data mining methods used, security issue they try to address
along with the dadaset used to evaluate thier performance.
Aydin et al. [5] proposed a hybrid IDS by combining
two approaches, namely, 1) packet header anomaly detection
(PHAD), and 2) network traffic anomaly detection (NETAD)
with the signature-based IDS Snort. Both PHAD and NETAD
methods are anomaly-based IDSs. The aydın et al.’s system
is tested on IDEVAL data, which shows that the number
of attacks detected increases significantly using the proposed
hybrid IDS as compared to signature-based systems. Authors
in [12] presented an anomaly detection technique based on
support vector machine (SVM) and genetic algorithm (GA), in
order to improve the performance of classification for SVMs.
The experimental results on the KDD CUP 1999 dataset show
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TABLE I
RELATED WORKS ON HYBRID INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
Year Paper Machine learning and data mining methods Cyber approach Data used
2009 Aydin et al. [5] - Packet header anomaly detection
- Network traffic anomaly detection
Hybrid IDS, which combing anomaly-based
IDSs
IDEVAL
2010 Wang et al. [6] - Artificial neural networks
Fuzzy clustering
Hybrid IDS, which the fuzzy aggregation
module is employed to aggregate the results
KDD CUP
1999
2011 Govindarajan and
Chandrasekaran [7]
- Multilayer perceptron neural network
- Radial basis function neural network
Neural based hybrid IDS UNM Send-
Mail Data
2012 Chunga and Wahidb
[8]
- Intelligent dynamic swarm
- Simplified swarm optimization
Hybrid IDS KDD CUP
1999
2013 Elbasiony et al. [9] - Random forests algorithm
- K-means clustering algorithm
Combining misuse and anomaly detection into
a hybrid framework
KDD CUP
1999
2014 Kim et al. [10] - C4.5 decision tree algorithm
- Support vector machine model
Combining misuse and anomaly detection into
a hybrid framework
NSL-KDD
2015 Lin et al. [11] - k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) classifier Combining cluster centers and nearest neigh-
bors
KDD CUP
1999
2016 Aslahi-Shahri et al.
[12]
- Support vector machine
- Genetic algorithm
Hybrid IDS KDD CUP
1999
2017 Kevric et al. [13] - Random tree
- C4.5 decision tree algorithm
- NBTree
Combining classifier model based on tree-
based algorithms
NSL-KDD
2017 Al-Yaseen et al. [14] - Support vector machine
- Extreme learning machine
- K-means clustering algorithm
Hybrid IDS KDD CUP
1999
2018 Ahmim et al. [15] - Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error, Reduction (RIP-
PER), RBF Network (RBFN), Ripple-down rule learner (Ridor), and
Random Forests
- Naive Bayes (NB)
Combining probability predictions of a tree of
classifiers
KDD CUP
1999 +
NSL-KDD
2018 Aljawarneh et al.
[16]
J48, Meta Pagging, RandomTree, REPTree, AdaBoostM1, Decision-
Stump, and NaiveBayes
Hybrid IDS, which combing anomaly-based
IDSs
NSL-KDD
Our work - REP Tree
- JRip algorithm
- Random Forest
Hybrid IDS, which combining classifier
model based on tree-based algorithms
CICIDS2017
• IDEVAL: MIT Lincoln Laboratories network traffic data
• KDD CUP 1999: The data set is based on DARPA 1998 TCP/IP data and has basic features captured by pcap (with about 4 million records of normal and attack traffic)
• UNM Send-Mail Data: The data set is based on an immune system developed at the University of New Mexico
• NSL-KDD: A modified version of KDD’99 data set, which it does not include redundant records in the train set.
• CICIDS2017: The dataset contains benign and the most up-to-date common attacks, which resembles the true real-world data (PCAPs) developed at Canadian Institute for
Cybersecurity (University of New Brunswick) [17]
an outstanding true-positive value of 0.973 that comes with a
0.017 of false-positive value.
Wang et al. [6] proposed an intrusion detection approach,
named FC-ANN, based on artificial neural networks (ANN)
and fuzzy clustering. The FC-ANN approach uses three main
modules, i.e., fuzzy clustering module, ANN module, and
fuzzy aggregation module. The fuzzy clustering module is
used to partition a given set of data into clusters. The ANN
module is used to learn the pattern of every subset. The fuzzy
aggregation module is used to aggregate different ANN’s result
and reduce any detection errors. The FC-ANN approach was
tested on the KDD CUP 1999 dataset and was proven to
be efficient against low-frequent attacks, i.e., R2L and U2R
attacks.
Govindarajan and Chandrasekaran [7] proposed a neural-
based hybrid IDS architecture using two methods, namely,
1) multilayer perceptron neural network (MLP), and 2) radial
basis function neural network (RBF). The procedures of hybrid
modeling using bagging classifiers are employed in order to
increase robustness, accuracy, and better overall generaliza-
tion. Moreover, the UNM Send-Mail Data is used in this
study, which is based on an immune system developed at the
University of New Mexico. The performance of the proposed
IDS in terms of accuracy was 98.88% and 94.31% for normal
and abnormal traffic respectively slightly better as compared
to the single classifiers that compose it.
Chunga and Wahidb [8] approach the problem of decision
rules generation by employing intelligent dynamic swarm
based rough set (IDS-RS) for feature selection and simplified
swarm optimization with weighted local search (SSO–WLS)
strategy for data classification. The study provides a full
system solution for improving the searching process in SSO
rule mining by weighing three predetermined constants. The
experimental results on the KDD CUP 1999 dataset show that
the proposed hybrid network intrusion detection system using
intelligent dynamic swarm based rough set, shows a good
overall performance with 93.3% accuracy in average of 20
runs.
Elbasiony et al. [9] presented a combination of misuse and
anomaly detection into a hybrid framework, which is based
on two methods, namely, 1) random forests algorithm, and
2) K-means clustering algorithm. Specifically, this framework
employs the random forests algorithm in misuse intrusion de-
tection as well as the k-means clustering algorithm in anomaly
detection. Due to correlated variables in random forests, this
framework has low model interpretability and performance
loss. Another study [10] integrates a misuse detection model
and an anomaly detection model in a decomposition structure.
This study uses the C4.5 decision tree algorithm and multiple
one-class SVM models. The experimental results on the NSL-
KDD dataset show that the proposed hybrid intrusion detection
method is better than the conventional methods in terms
of detection performance, training time, and testing time.
Lin et al. [11] proposed a feature representation approach,
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Fig. 1. General structure of our proposed model.
named CANN, which combining cluster centers and nearest
neighbors. The CANN approach uses three steps, namely,
1) Extraction of cluster centers and nearest neighbors, 2)
Measurement and summing of the distance between all data,
and 3) Classifier training and testing, which is based on the
k-NN algorithm. The experimental results on the KDD CUP
1999 dataset show that CANN approach performs better than
the k-NN and SVM classifiers.
Recently, a number of researchers have proposed the com-
bination of classifiers in order to improve the overall perfor-
mance under the NSL-KDD dataset [13], [14], [15], [16], [17].
In [13], Kevric et al. proposed a combining classifier approach
using tree algorithms, namely, random tree, C4.5 decision tree
algorithm, and NBTree. In [14], Al-Yaseen et al. proposed a
hybrid IDS that uses support vector machine, extreme learning
machine, and K-means clustering algorithm. The experimental
results on the KDD CUP 1999 dataset show that the proposed
hybrid network intrusion detection system can improve the
overall performance and achieve an overall 95.75% accuracy.
In order to evaluate the performance of an IDS system,
both KDD’99 and NSL-KDD datasets are commonly used. In
[15], Ahmim et al. proposed an IDS system, named HCPTC-
IDS, which is based on combining probability predictions of
a tree of classifiers. The HCPTC-IDS system is composed
of two layers, namely, 1) the first layer, which is a tree of
classifiers, and 2) The second layer, which is a final classifier
that combines the different probability predictions of the first
layer. The experiments on KDD’99 and NSL-KDD show that
the HCPTC-IDS system is more precise than other recently
proposed intrusion detection systems having accuracy equal
to 96.27% for KDD’99 and 89.75% for NSL-KDD.
Most of the relevant works use the KDD and NSL-KDD
datasets, which are outdated and of very limited practical value
for a modern IDS. Both benign and malicious network traffic
has changed significantly since 1999 when these datasets were
produced and the results obtained using them are of a limited
value most of the times.
In order to overcome shortcoming of previous proposed
methods, like low detection of rare attack, miss-classification
of attacks and time overhead we propose a novel Hybrid
IDS, which combines different classifier models, namely, REP
Tree, JRip algorithm and Random Forest. Besides, we use
the CICIDS2017 dataset [17], which we split in training and
testing datasets, in order to evaluate their performances in
detecting network intrusions and we compare it with other
machine learning methods proposed by previous researchers,
including, WISARD [18], ForestPA [19], J48 Consolidated
[20], LIBSVM [21], FURIA [22], RandomForest, REPTree,
MLP, NaiveBayes, Jrip and J48.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
Based on the values of the features the classifier makes
rules which are used in order to correctly classify the data
set. In general, for the same data set, if the number of classes
increases, the sub-data set of each class decreases, leading to
the decrease of the generalization capability and the increase
of classification errors and vice versa. The miss-classification
is usually due to the classification of the attacks as normal
behavior, or as another attack in the same or different category.
In order to minimize these classification errors and to increase
the performance of intrusion detection mechanism, we propose
the intrusion detection hierarchical model illustrated in figure
1.
Our hierarchical model aims to detect the correct type
of each attack, provides a low false alarm rate and a high
detection rate. It is composed of three classifiers. The first one
uses the different features of the data set as inputs, in order
to classify each row as benign or attack. The second one uses
different features of the data set as inputs for classifying each
row as benign or one of the different categories of attacks.
The third classifier uses all the features of the initial data set
in addition to the outputs of the first and the second classifier
as inputs, in order to classify each row of the data set as benign
or a specific type of attack.
A. Operation Mode
The operation mode of our proposed model is composed of
two steps: training and testing.
1) Training Step: In this step, we train the three classifiers
that compose our hierarchical model. We start by training the
first and the second one and using the results from these two
we train the third classifier. Initially, the training Data set is
labelled as benign and specific type of Attack. To train the
first classifier, we modify the training data set, by labelling
each row as ”Attack” and ”Benign”. Then, we normalize the
different features of the data set. After that, we perform the
training of this classifier and as result of this sub step, we get
model 1. To train the second classifier, we modify the training
data set, where use initial labelling of rows where each specific
attack is identified. Then, we normalize the different features
of the data set. After that, we perform the training of this
classifier and as result of this sub step, we get model 2.
In order to train the third classifier, we modify the training
data set, where we add two columns, the first one represents
the classification results of model 1 for the rows of the training
data set and the second one represents the classification results
of model 2 for the rows of the training data set. Then, we
normalize the different features of the data set. After that, we
perform the training of this classifier and as result of this sub
step, we get model 3.
2) Test Step: As illustrated in Figure 1, in order to test our
hierarchical model, we process each row of the test data set
by model 1 and model 2, then we add the outputs of model
1 and model 2 to the features of each row, and finally, we
process the result rows by model 3 that classify it as Benign
or a specific type of attack.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
In this section, we present in detail the Data Set used
along with the Data pre-processing procedure. We also give
the performance metrics used in our experiments. Moreover,
we present the structure of our model. Finally, we provide a
comparative study between our model and that of different
classifiers. The experiments are done on a Windows 10 - 64
bits PC with 8 GB RAM and CPU Intel(R) I5 2.7 GHz.
Weka Data Mining Tools and MySQL data base are used to
implement our model.
A. Data set and Data pre-processing
In our experiments, we use CICIDS 2017 [17], which
represents a data set that satisfy the eleven indispensable char-
acteristics of a valid IDS dataset, namely Anonymity, Attack
Diversity, Complete Capture, Complete Interaction, Complete
Network Configuration, Available Protocols, Complete Traffic,
Feature Set, Metadata, Heterogeneity, and Labelling [23].
CICIDS 2017 contains 2,830,743 rows devised on 8 files,
each row having 79 features. Each row of CICIDS 2017 is
labelled as Benign or one of fourteen type of attack. Table II
summarizes the distribution of different attack type and Benign
rows.
In order to create a training and test subset, we concatenate
the 8 files in one same table that contains all benign and attacks
rows. Then, we remove all rows that have the feature ”Flow
Packets/s” equal to ’Infinity’ or ’NaN’. After that, we remove
the features that have a the same value for all rows, namely
Bwd PSH Flags,Bwd URG Flags, Fwd Avg Bytes/Bulk, Fwd
Avg Packets/Bulk, Fwd Avg Bulk/Rate, Bwd Avg Bytes/Bulk,
Bwd Avg Packets/Bulk, Bwd Avg Bulk/Rate and Fwd Avg
Bytes/Bulk.
After the elimination of these features, we extract the
training and test subsets based on the distribution described in
table II. In each subset we tried to include rows that contain
all the attacks but the same row cannot appear in both subsets.
For the training sub set, we select the first rows of each type.
Then, For the test sub set, we select randomly the rows after
the suppression of the training sub set rows. Finally, each
TABLE II
COMPOSITION OF TRAINING AND TEST SUB-SETS
Label Total Total(-rows
with lack info)
Training Test
BENIGN BENIGN 2273097 2271320 20000 20000
DOS
DDoS 128027 128025 2700 3300
DoS
slowloris
5796 5796 1350 1650
DoS
Slowhttptest
5499 5499 2171 1169
DoS Hulk 231073 230124 4500 5500
DoS
GoldenEye
10293 10293 1300 700
Heartbleed 11 11 5 5
PortScan PortScan 158930 158804 3808 4192
Bot Bot 1966 1956 936 624
Brute-Force FTP-Patator 7938 7935 900 1100SSH-Patator 5897 5897 900 1100
Web Attack
Web Attack-
Brute Force
1507 1507 910 490
Web Attack-
XSS
652 652 480 160
Web Attack-
Sql Injection
21 21 16 4
Infiltration Infiltration 36 36 24 6
Total Attack 471454 470365 20000 20000
Total 2830743 2827876 40000 40000
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX
Predicted class
Negative class Positive
Actual class Negative Class True negative (TN) False positive (FP)Positive Class False negative (FN) True positive (TP)
value xi of the feature j is normalized based on the following
equation:
xi( j) =
xi( j)−min(x( j))
max(x( j))−min(x( j)) (1)
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF OUR MODEL AND OTHER CLASSIFIERS RELATIVE TO THE DIFFERENT ATTACK TYPE AND BENIGN
Our
Model
WISARD
[18]
Forest
PA [19]
J48 Consol-
idated [20]
LIBSVM
[21]
FURIA
[22]
Random
Forest
REP
Tree
MLP Naive
Bayes
Jrip J48
TNR
(BENIGN)
98.855% 97.135% 96.450% 93.355% 94.870% 96.835% 98.120% 95.165% 92.650% 66.545% 95.530% 94.960%
DR DDoS 99.879% 54.697% 99.818% 93.212% 55.970% 99.758% 99.818% 99.788% 91.212% 93.879% 99.667% 99.788%
DR DoS
slowloris
97.758% 78.909% 92.848% 95.030% 78.182% 93.758% 93.758% 92.727% 78.485% 82.667% 93.333% 93.879%
DR DoS
Slowhttptest
93.841% 23.353% 86.826% 83.832% 76.561% 78.358% 81.352% 75.364% 88.537% 70.060% 85.543% 80.325%
DR DoS Hulk 96.782% 67.600% 93.945% 95.891% 73.709% 98.655% 95.164% 92.218% 86.891% 73.782% 97.364% 93.600%
DR DoS
GoldenEye
67.571% 48.714% 67.571% 67.143% 57.571% 65.143% 67.571% 66.429% 65.429% 62.143% 63.857% 67.286%
DR
Heartbleed
100% 80.000% 100% 80.000% 0.000% 40.000% 100% 100% 0.000% 80.000% 80.000% 100%
DR PortScan 99.881% 51.407% 99.594% 99.046% 48.521% 87.118% 99.881% 99.881% 48.521% 99.499% 99.881% 98.569%
DR Bot 46.474% 1.442% 48.718% 52.083% 0.000% 48.077% 49.679% 47.756% 51.282% 29.968% 46.474% 47.756%
DR FTP-
Patator
99.636% 0.000% 99.727% 100% 0.000% 99.636% 99.727% 99.182% 99.000% 99.455% 99.545% 99.545%
DR SSH-
Patator
99.909% 0.000% 100% 99.727% 0.000% 100% 99.818% 100% 99.727% 99.182% 100% 100%
DR Web At-
tack - Brute
Force
73.265% 4.694% 73.469% 55.102% 80.816% 49.796% 70.408% 70.816% 90.408% 5.102% 61.837% 60.408%
DR Web At-
tack - XSS
30.625% 1.250% 34.375% 48.750% 0.000% 38.750% 37.500% 32.500% 1.875% 91.875% 38.125% 41.250%
DR Web At-
tack - Sql In-
jection
50.000% 0.000% 50.000% 100% 0.000% 50.000% 100% 50.000% 50.000% 100% 75.000% 50.000%
DR
Infiltration
100% 50.000% 83.333% 100% 0.000% 83.333% 83.333% 83.333% 16.667% 83.333% 100% 66.667%
TABLE V
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF OUR MODEL AND OTHER CLASSIFIERS
Our
Model
WISARD
[18]
Forest
PA [19]
J48 Con-
solidated
[20]
LIBSVM
[21]
FURIA
[22]
Random
Forest
REP
Tree
MLP Naive
Bayes
Jrip J48
FAR 1.145% 2.865% 3.550% 6.645% 5.130% 3.165% 1.880% 4.835% 7.350% 33.455% 4.470% 5.040%
DR (Overall) 94.475% 48.175% 92.920% 92.020% 54.595% 90.500% 93.050% 91.640% 77.830% 82.510% 93.400% 91.990%
Accuracy 96.665% 72.655% 94.685% 92.688% 74.733% 93.668% 95.585% 93.403% 85.240% 74.528% 94.465% 93.475%
Training Time 159.5 s 13.47 s 110.64 s 105.46 s 318.6 s 234.98 s 20.03 s 2.73 s 942.98 s 0.45 s 76.65 s 8.34 s
Test Time 2.27 s 243.28 s 0.99 s 0.61 s 343.96 s 0.96 s 1.7 s 0.52 s 1.61 s 12.39 s 0.51 s 1.12 s
B. Performance metrics
IDS performance is evaluated based on its capability of
classifying network traffic into a correct type. Table III, also
known as confusion matrix, shows all the possible cases of
classification.
To evaluate our model, we used two groups of metrics. The
first group includes specific metrics: the detection rate (DR)
of each type of attack and the true negative rate. The second
one includes global metrics: global detection rate, false alarm
rate (FAR) and accuracy. The following equations summarize
how to calculate theses metrics.
DRAttackType =
T PAttackType
T PAttackType +FNAttackType
(2)
T NRBENIGN =
T NBENIGN
T NBENIGN +FPBENIGN
(3)
FAR =
FPBENIGN
T NBENIGN +FPBENIGN
(4)
DROverall =
T PO f−Each−Attack−Type
T PO f−Each−Attack−Type +FNO f−Each−Attack−Type
(5)
Accuracy =
T PO f−Each−Attack−Type+
T PO f−Each−Attack−Type +FNO f−Each−Attack−Type+
T NBENIGN
T NBENIGN +FPBENIGN
(6)
C. Practical structure of our model
Our model demands a pre-processing of data, different la-
belling of rows according to the model that is used and creation
of artificial features that are outputs of two of the classifiers
used. For training the first classifier we need to label the
training data set based on the attacks classification provided
in table II as ”Attack” or ’Bening’. For the second classifier,
we label each attack as follows : DDoS, DoS slowloris,
DoS Slowhttptest, DoS Hulk, DoS GoldenEye, Heartbleed
as ”DoS”; FTP-Patator, SSH-Patator as ”Brute-Force”; Web
Attack - Brute Force, Web Attack - XSS, Web Attack - Sql
Injection as ”Web Attack”. Finally, in order to train the third
classifier, we use the labling used for the second classifier we
add the outputs of the trained classifier 1 and classifier 2 as
new features.
The choice of the three classifiers that compose our hi-
erarchical model is the most important and critical step. To
choose the best composition, that gives optimal performance,
we tested several compositions with different classifiers. The
results for all those combinations are quite lengthy and are not
represnted in this article. Following this demanding procedure,
we opt for the following configuration: classifier 1 is REP Tree
[24] ; classifier 2 is Jrip [25]; classifier 3 is Forest PA [19].
D. Comparative Study
To evaluate our proposed model, we compare it with some
well known classifiers and some recent ones namely J48,
Jrip, Naive Bayes, MLP, REP Tree, Random Forest, FURIA
[22], LIBSVM [21], J48 Consolidated [20], Forest PA [19],
WISARD [18]. In this comparative study we use the different
metrics detailed in sub section IV-B, in addition to training
and test time.
Table IV summarizes the performance of our model compared
to the other classifiers for different attacks and Benign traffic.
It shows that our hierarchical model gives the highest true
negative rate (TNR) with 98.855% and the higest detection
rate (DR) for six attacks type namely DDoS with 99.879%,
DoS slowloris with 97.758%, DoS Slowhttptest with 93.841%,
DoS GoldenEye with 67.571%, Heartbleed 100%, PortScan
99.881%, Infiltration 100%. Moreover our hierarchical model
is very close to the highest detection rate for two type of
attacks namely FTP Patator with 99.636% and SSH Patator
with 99.909%. For the rest of attacks type, our model gives an
average performance compared to the other models. Overall,
our model is the model that performs best for most of the
different attacks type and it never has the lowest performance
for any type of attack.
Table V summarizes the global performance of our model
as compared to the other classifiers. As shown in table V our
model gives the highest overall detection rate (DR Overall)
with 94.475% , the highest accuracy with 96.665% , and
lowest false alarm rate (FAR) with 1.145%. The training time
of our model is 195.5 seconds and the test time is 2.27 seconds,
which represents an acceptable training and test time for a
hybrid hierarchical model especially when compared to simple
models such as MLP and SVM.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an hierarchical intrusion de-
tection system based on the combination of three different
classifiers namely, REP Tree, JRip algorithm and Forest PA.
The proposed model consists of three classifiers, where the
outputs of the two of them to be used as inputs for the third.
The evaluation using a real traffic data set ’CICIDS2017’
showed that our hierarchical model outperformed different
well known and recent machine learning models, giving the
highest TNR and highest DR for seven of the attacks that exist
in it. In overall, our model gives the highest DR with 94.457%,
the highest accuracy with 96.665%, and the lowest FAR with
1.145% while on the same its low computational time makes
it easily incorporable in a soft real time system.
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